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Abstract
Early regulator interventions into problem banks is one of the key suggestions of
Basel Committee on Banking Supervision. However, no guidance is given on their
design. To ﬁll this gap, we outline an incentive-based preventive supervision strat-
egy that eliminates bad asset management in banks. Two supervision techniques
are combined: temporary regulatory administration and random audits. Our design
ensures good management without excessive supervision costs, through a gradual
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1 Introduction
"The regulators substituted a more detailed look at the banks with just looking at outputs
from models. They got lazy."
Select Committee on Economic Aﬀairs Report (2009)
The recent ﬁnancial crisis has proved once again the need for eﬀective preventive
banking supervision. If regulators had been able to detect potential threats at early
stages, many of the negative consequences of bank distress could have been avoided.
To some extent, this inability to anticipate problems can be explained by an excessive
regulatory reliance on the outcomes of stress-testing models, and the concomitant lack
of deeper analysis of bank management practices. The lightning progress of information
technology has signiﬁcantly contributed to this tendency, so that business intelligence
has largely replaced human intelligence in the supervisory process. However, another
plausible explanation for the lack of eﬀective supervision in the pre-crisis period is the
unclear oﬃcial instructions on the supervision process. In fact, even though Basel Accord
suggests implementing early supervisory measures for the troubled banks, it does not
specify their design: the regulator is left to draw information from the ﬁnancial markets,
taking supervisory measures based on the warning signals they send.
Indeed, in practice, the regulator is faced with numerous challenges related to super-
vision design. One of the basic problems is how to determine the optimal frequency and
duration of supervision events. On the one hand, higher frequency makes banks more
inclined to conform with regulatory rules, and longer duration of regulatory interventions
improves the quality of regulatory information, thereby, potentially resulting in better
design of any corrective measures. On the other hand, more supervision has a cost and
regulatory resources are limited. Another problem is the choice of supervision technology.
The quality of supervision technology strongly depends on its cost. For instance, on-site
inspection of a bank is much more costly than external balance sheet examination, but
provides a more complete picture of the bank's ﬁnancial health, through better access
to reliable information. To sum up, the fundamental issue of supervision design can be
stated as follows: how can eﬀective supervision be ensured without excessive supervision
spending?
Surprisingly, very few studies address the design of preventive supervision. Most
authors1 consider supervision as an adjunct to capital regulation, ignoring its preventive
eﬀect. Nevertheless, appropriate theoretical background can be found in Décamps et al.
(2004) and Rochet (2004). To combat moral hazard in bank asset management, both
papers suggest realizing regulatory intervention which can be interpreted as temporary
1See, for instance, Merton (1978), Dangl and Lehar (2002), Bhattacharya et al. (2002).
regulatory administration.2 However, this form of preventive supervision might be too
costly, whereas the same incentive eﬀect on banks can be achieved at lower cost through
the use of random audits as a part of supervision process.
In this study we propose an alternative preventive supervision strategy that relies on
a combination of two supervision techniques: random audits and temporary regulatory
administration. By gradually adjusting the level of supervision in line with the bank's
ﬁnancial health, this strategy allows the regulator to induce the bank to adopt good
management practice without excessive supervision costs.
First, we consider the benchmark case, where the regulator has a single perfect audit
technology at his disposal. We show that combining random audits with temporary
administrations allows the regulator to prevent moral hazard in the bank and immediately
yields signiﬁcant cost savings compared to the case, where preventive supervision relies
uniquely on temporary regulatory administrations. Moreover, supervision costs can be
kept to a minimum through optimal choice of random audit frequency. Ideally, audit
frequency should be continuously adjusted to the ﬁnancial health of the bank, increasing
with any depreciation in the value of bank assets. However, in practice it may be quite
diﬃcult to ensure credible commitment to this supervision strategy. Given that audit
frequency is contingent on the bank's cash ﬂow, the bank's management would ﬁnd it
diﬃcult to estimate real audit frequency. Inability to make this internal assessment will
lead to a lack of conﬁdence in the regulatory strategy, destroying its incentive eﬀect. To
avoid this, we propose a practical solution involving several random audit regions with
stepwise adjustable audit frequency.
Second, we consider the case where the regulator has an access to a continuum of
audit technologies that diﬀer in quality and cost. We show that, generally, there is no
need to use the perfect (and most expensive) audit technology all the time, as the same
incentive eﬀect on the bank can be achieved with lower audit quality, and therefore at
lower cost. An interesting evidence we obtain that, given the option of adjusting audit
frequency, it appears optimal to maintain a single audit technology, such that delivers
the lowest "cost/quality" ratio, rather than to adjust audit quality over the audit region.
Another current challenge to supervisory practice addressed in this study is the del-
egation of supervisory functions. Basel Committee on Banking Supervision actively en-
courages participation by external audit ﬁrms in the supervisory process, recognizing
that "banking supervisors are often able to exercise a persuasive inﬂuence over banks in
achieving uniform policies because of their regulatory powers, while external auditors are
often better placed to monitor or review the actual application of such policies" (para 70
2During temporary administration the regulator takes control of the bank's management policy and
enforces shareholders to stick to ﬁnancial recovery plans. For example, such a regulatory regime is
implemented by the Central Bank of Russia to prevent problem banks from going bankrupt.
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of BIS (2002)). However, many related issues are still requiring clariﬁcation. Whether
external auditors should completely replace regulators in the supervisory process? How
often banks should be audited by external auditors? How external auditors should be
paid in order to have incentives to do their job properly?
To get answers, we consider a setting where audit technology can be delegated to
an independent audit agency which is able to provide better quality audits at the same
cost, but whose eﬀort level is unobservable by the regulator. In this context the regulator
is faced with a problem of double moral hazard : given that lower audit quality implies
lower cost, the agency may be tempted to shirk its duty. As a result, the bank will lose
the incentive to maintain good management, which will destroy the preventive eﬀect of
supervision.
We show in this context that a partial delegation of random audits to the external
audit agency would be beneﬁcial for the regulator. However, to eliminate double moral
hazard, he needs to oﬀer the agency a contract containing incentives to promote good
management in the bank. The basic idea behind this contract design is to link agency
welfare to bank ﬁnancial health. We show that the agency's choice of audit eﬀort depends
on the contract's continuation value, which represents the current expected value of all
future proﬁts that the agency can extract from the contract. Thus, the regulator can
induce the bank to good management at minimum cost, by providing the agency the
minimum incentive contract continuation value. In the end, the overall design of incentive
supervision is explicitly inferred from this minimum incentive contract continuation value.
One of the interesting evidences we get in this context is that delegated audits should
not completely replace regulatory audits.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. In Section 2 we review the literature.
Section 3 presents the concept of preventive supervision. Section 4 examines the optimal
supervision design in the nondelegation framework. In Section 5 we discuss the optimal
supervision strategy in a setting where random audit technology can be delegated to an
independent audit agency. Section 6 concludes. All proofs are provided in Appendix B.
2 Related literature
The bank regulation literature can be divided into two strands oﬀering diﬀerent views
on the role of supervision.
According to the traditional view, supervision is used to reinforce capital regulation.
In fact, many studies (see, for instance, Rochet (1992), Hellmann et al. (2000), Fries
et al. (1997)) argue that even risk-based capital requirements, if implemented alone,
are insuﬃcient to curb the excessive risk-taking propensity of banks. Consequently, the
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regulator needs to use additional tools as a reinforcement. The most explicit argument
for assigning this role to supervision is provided in Merton (1977). Examining regula-
tor liabilities under an option-pricing approach, he shows that it is possible to mitigate
excessive risk-taking incentives for banks by reducing the time between regulatory inspec-
tions. Given the preceding result, Merton (1978) introduces supervision in the form of
the random audit. This design has been adopted by many studies in the same ﬁeld. For
example, Dangl and Lehar (2002) examine the combined eﬀect of capital requirements
and random audits on risk-taking in banks. They show that the risk-weight capital reg-
ulation of Basel II requires less audit eﬀort than the building-block approach of Basel I.
Bhattacharya et al. (2002) ﬁnd that higher random audit frequency makes it possible
to reduce minimum capital requirements. Milne and Whalley (2001) show a positive
relationship between audit frequency and capital buﬀer. Finally, Elizalde (2007) applies
a risk-sensitive concept of capital requirements to supervisory process and shows that
riskier banks should be audited more frequently. None of the above papers, however,
raises the question of optimal audit frequency, although this directly aﬀects supervision
costs. They also consider audit technology as perfect.
A second strand of the literature on supervision asserts its incentive eﬀect on man-
agement technology in banks. Based on Dewatripont and Tirole (1994), this approach
sets aside the excessive risk-taking issue and proceeds from the problem of moral hazard
in bank asset management. In this view, moral hazard implies a socially ineﬃcient choice
of management technology. It arises when bank management technology is unobservable
from outside. In this context, supervision serves to detect management quality and to
impose early corrective measures if necessary. Consistent with this idea, Décamps et al.
(2004) interpret moral hazard as the irreversible decision by the bank to cease costly
monitoring of assets. To prevent moral hazard, two regulatory solutions are possible.
The ﬁrst is to introduce minimum capital requirements that will prevent the bad man-
agement choice. However, this would impose stricter regulatory closure rules on banks.
The second solution is to complement the existing closure rules by regulatory interven-
tion. Regulatory intervention should cover the whole region where moral hazard arises,
in order to prevent bad bank management. Taking this concept a step further, Rochet
(2004) considers reversible management technology and takes into account supervision
costs, showing the existence of an optimal combination of closure thresholds and inspec-
tion thresholds that maximizes social welfare.
Our study continues in the vein of the second strand of the literature, seeking the
optimal preventive supervision design. As using temporary regulatory administration
throughout is too costly, we partially replace it with random audits while still eliminat-
ing moral hazard. However, in contrast to the random-audit literature cited above, we
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consider random audits as the regulatory incentive tool which will completely eliminate
misbehavior in the bank. A crucial point of our model is that random audits are used to
check the quality of bank management technology rather than to verify the bank's compli-
ance with capital requirements, as it was, for example, considered by Merton (1978) and
Bhattacharya et al. (2002). Moreover, we focus on the choice of both audit frequency and
audit quality, allowing for the optimal allocation of regulatory resources given auditing
costs.3
On the question of delegating audit technology to an independent audit agency, we
refer to the literature on optimal contracts in the continuous-time principal-agent frame-
work. Generally, this literature considers a setting where the principal delegates some
stochastic production technology to the agent. In this case, the optimal contract should
specify the agent's eﬀort and remuneration. Holmstrom and Milgrom (1987) show that,
for exponential utility function and single terminal payoﬀ, the optimal contract will lin-
early depend on aggregated outcome. Cvitanic et al. (2009) consider a general form
of utility function. They ﬁnd that the optimal contract is non-linear in this case, but
also depends on the ﬁnal outcome value. Williams (2009) considers continuous agent
rewards and shows that the optimal contract can be speciﬁed by two adjoint state pro-
cesses: promised utility and marginal cost of agent consumption. Working in a similar
setting, Sannikov (2008) builds the optimal contract on a single state variable  the agent
continuation value which represents the agent expected utility. He ﬁnds that the agent
can be retired in two cases: either when his continuation value falls to zero or when it
becomes suﬃciently large, making it too costly for the principal to compensate the agent
for his eﬀort.
Our study, too, seeks the optimal contract between the regulator (the principal) and
the audit agency (the agent). But the nature of the problem we address is quite diﬀerent:
we deal with a tripartite framework where the moral hazard of the agency automatically
implies the moral hazard of the bank. Consequently, the choice of the optimal audit eﬀort
will be constrained by the need to create incentives for the bank. Thus, in our model the
optimal audit eﬀort determines the incentive-compatible contract continuation value, the
latter being used to derive the optimal compensation scheme. It should be noted that the
problem of double moral hazard was studied in Strausz (1996) in a one-period discrete-
time game. However, he allows for two incentive contracts (one for the independent
supervisor and one for the agent) and takes the quality of monitoring technology as being
3Within a non-random audit framework, however, Pages and Santos (2001) deﬁne the optimal time
between regulatory interventions, comparing a gain from immediate bank closure and the expected gain
from a postponed closure decision. Whereas Andersen and Harr (2008) make the quality of audit
technology increasing on costly audit eﬀort and show that, under growing competition in the banking
sector, the regulator will optimally choose lower audit quality.
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independent of monitoring eﬀort.
3 The model
We consider the problem of moral hazard in bank asset management and construct
our model based on Rochet (2004). First, we brieﬂy recall the modeling background.
Then, we present our concept of mixed supervision.
3.1 Moral hazard in bank asset management
Consider a risk-neutral environment with two agents, a bank and a bank regulator,
discounting future payments at rate r. The bank is ﬁnanced by deposits, D, fully insured
by the Deposit Insurance Fund (DIF). Bank technology generates a publicly observable
cash ﬂow, xt, which evolves following the process:
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dxt = µxtdt+ σxtdWt, (1)
where σ is cash-ﬂow volatility, µ > 1/2σ2 is the expected cash-ﬂow growth rate and
{Wt}t≥0 is a standard Wiener process.
The bank's cash ﬂow is shared between depositors and shareholders: depositors collect
interest payments rD per unit of time, and xt−rD goes to shareholders. When xt−rD <
0, bank shareholders take cash from their "deep pockets" to ensure continuity of debt
service, as long as they are interested in keeping the bank alive.
Since a large part of bank assets consists of loans, the bank's asset performance entirely
depends on the borrowers' productive technology, unobservable by the bank. To ensure
the high expected cash-ﬂow growth rate µ = µG, the bank managers need to make a
costly monitoring eﬀort, spending a constant amount γr per unit of time.5 In the absence
of monitoring eﬀort, asset quality deteriorates and the expected cash-ﬂow growth rate
decreases to µB < µG. To focus on the moral hazard problem, without encumbering the
model, we assume that monitoring eﬀort does not aﬀect cash-ﬂow volatility. Hereafter, we
employ the term good management technology to indicate the presence of asset monitoring
eﬀort and the term bad management technology otherwise.
It can be shown that, under limited liability, bad management technology becomes
optimal when the bank's asset cash ﬂow gets relatively weak. However, since x/(r−µB) <
4Our model is built on the observable cash-ﬂow value, whereas the model of Rochet (2004) is built on
the observable bank asset value. However, since the bank's cash ﬂow is proportional to the bank's asset
value, there is a direct correspondence between these two settings, so that the results of our model can
be reinterpreted in terms of the bank's asset value.
5There is no agency problem, i.e., bank managers act in the best interest of bank shareholders.
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x/(r−µG), bad management reduces the market value of bank assets, which would impose
higher liabilities on the DIF in the case of the bank's failure.6 Therefore, bad management
should be prevented by the regulator.
To prevent bad management, the regulator can set the optimal closure rule xBR, such
that the bank would have incentives to stick with good management for all x ≥ xBR (see
Rochet(2004), Proposition 2):
x∗R =
−β2(D + γ) + γr/∆µ
νG(1− β2) , (2)
where νG = (r − µG)−1 and β2 is a negative root of 1/2σ2β2 + (µG − 1/2σ2)β = r.
However, liquidation threshold x∗R can be too high, potentially leading to a large
number of bank closures. This makes x∗R costly to implement in practice and gives a
reason to look for alternative solutions involving the use of supervision.
In this study we consider an arbitrary regulatory closure rule xR < x
∗
R that creates
the conditions for moral hazard. Our goal is to show how the regulator can prevent
moral hazard at minimum cost by means of the optimally-designed incentive supervision
strategy.7
3.2 Mixed supervision strategy as a regulatory response
In order to ensure preventive supervision without excessive supervision costs, we
propose adjusting the strictness of supervision to the bank's ﬁnancial health. This idea
underlies a mixed supervision strategy that combines two supervision techniques: random
audits and temporary regulatory administration. The random audit consists in a spot
check on the management process in a bank. Audit events follow a Poisson process
with frequency ψ(x) and carry the cost αcr per audit. During temporary regulatory
administration, the regulator takes control of management strategy, trying to extract the
bank from the distress (the original bank's owners, however, remain in place and continue
bearing all operating costs). In contrast to the random audit, temporary regulatory
administration may last for some time, carrying instantaneous cost cr per unit of time.
We assume that instantaneous audit costs do not exceed instantaneous costs of temporary
regulatory administration, i.e., α ≤ 1.8
6We assume that, because of the incomplete transferability of private bank information to a new
owner and liquidation costs, the resale market value of assets, λx/(r−µi), i = {G,B}, is lower than their
economic value, i.e., λ < 1.
7Note that, once the optimal incentive supervision strategy is speciﬁed for any given xR < x
∗
R, it is
possible to endogenize xR, by solving a general welfare-maximization problem, which would take into
account the bank's social value and the total expected supervision costs.
8The case α > 1 is feasible as well, but would lead to low audit intensity.
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The concept of a mixed supervision strategy is presented by Fig. 1. For a given closure
rule xR, the regulator should set two supervision thresholds (their design is discussed
below), audit threshold xA and inspection threshold xI , in such a way that the interval
[xR, xA] would cover the whole moral hazard region. It can easily be shown that it is
always optimal to implement the random audit technology when the bank's cash ﬂow is
not too low, and to undertake temporary regulatory administration in the neighborhood
of the liquidation threshold. Thus, xR < xI < xA.
Figure 1: Concept of mixed supervision
The regulator monitors the bank's cash-ﬂow dynamics. As long as x ≥ xA, he remains
inactive. In the region [xI , xA) he implements random audits in order to check the
management technology employed in the bank. If bad management is revealed during the
audit, shareholders will be deprived of equity.9 This feature is crucial for our model, since
the threat of equity losses will create incentive eﬀect for good management technology.10
In the region [xR, xI) the regulator undertakes temporary regulatory administration in
order to maintain good management in the bank. Temporary regulatory administration
lasts until either the bank's cash ﬂow is restored (x ≥ xI) or decreases to liquidation
point xR.
Now consider the design of supervision thresholds. Recall that the main aim of the
regulator is to maintain good asset management in the bank. The bank managers max-
imize the bank's equity value. At each moment of time they optimally choose the eﬀort
level et, where:
et =
1 good management technology0 bad management technology
We introduce the operator A(e) such that:
A(e)f(x) = 1/2σ2x2f ′′(x) + (µB + ∆µe)xf ′(x)− rf(x), (3)
where ∆µ = µG − µB and f(x) is any contingent claim.
9For example, the expropriation of shareholders might be viewed as the nationalization of the bank.
10A less extreme way to promote incentives for good management at the bank would be to impose a
penalty, when the bad management is uncovered during the audit.
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Then, the optimization program of the bank managers can be written as:
max
et∈{0,1}
{A(et)E(xt) + xt − rD − γret} = 0, (4)
where E(xt) denotes the bank's equity value.
Consequently, managers will choose the good management technology when
∆µxE ′G(x) ≥ γr, (5)
where EG(x) (deﬁned in Appendix A.1) denotes the bank's equity value under good
management.
Expression (5) shows that, in the absence of supervision, a switch to bad management
would be optimal when the expected instantaneous loss of equity value becomes less than
instantaneous monitoring costs. Moreover, as the lower bank cash ﬂow results in lower
"costs" for the bad technology choice (∆µxE ′G(x) is increasing on x), we conclude that
moral hazard increases when cash ﬂow weakens.
Let xA denote the critical cash-ﬂow level that provides equality in (5). In the absence
of supervision, bank managers will maintain good management technology for x ≥ xA
and choose bad management for x < xA. Consequently, any audit threshold lower than
xA will raise moral hazard, while any audit threshold higher than xA will generate useless
random audit costs. Thus, for the rest of the paper, the audit threshold is set at xA.
Anticipating moral hazard for x < xA, the regulator will start performing random
audits when cash ﬂow falls below the audit threshold. To focus on the incentive eﬀect of
random audits, we consider here that audit technology is perfect, i.e., it always reveals
the true management technology employed by the bank.11 Therefore, by choosing bad
management on x < xA, bank managers can lose equity value with probability ψ(x)dt
in a small period of time dt.12 This increases the expected instantaneous costs of a bad
management choice and modiﬁes managers' optimization program as follows:
max
et∈{0,1}
{A(et)E(xt) + xt − rD − γret + ψ(xt)E(xt)(et − 1)} = 0, (6)
where x < xA. Solving this problem yields the following incentive-compatibility con-
straint:
∆µxE ′G(x) + ψ(x)EG(x) ≥ γr. (7)
Let xI(ψ) denote the critical cash-ﬂow level that ensures equality in (7). Note that
random audits allow the regulator to induce the bank to use good management practice
11In Section 4.2 we examine supervision design under imperfect audit quality.
12Since there is no agency problem, we use the terms "shareholders" and "managers" interchangeably.
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when x ∈ [xI(ψ), xA). When x ∈ [xR, xI(ψ)) the random audit eﬀort becomes insuﬃcient
to create incentives and temporary regulatory administration becomes necessary to ensure
continuing good management. As the left part of (7) is increasing on ψ(x), the feasible
set of inspection thresholds will be given by xI ∈ [xI(ψ), xA]. Thus, under a mixed su-
pervision strategy with audit threshold xA and inspection threshold xI ∈ [xI(ψ), xA], the
bank will never use bad management technology, i.e., supervision will have a preventive
eﬀect.
To conclude this section, we consider the total costs of mixed supervision. Their
current value represents the expected discounted value of future regulatory spending (i.e.,
the total costs of temporary regulatory administration and random audits), conditional
on the current bank cash-ﬂow value x0 ≥ xA:
C(x0) = E
[∫ τR
0
e−rt(cr1xt∈[xR,xI) + ψ(xt)αcr1xt∈[xI ,xA))dt
]
, (8)
where τR denotes the ﬁrst time when the bank's cash ﬂow reaches regulatory closure
threshold xR.
Note that C(x0) can be also presented as the expected cost of temporary regulatory
administration implemented over the whole moral hazard region minus a cost gain from
random audits:
C(x0) = E
[∫ τR
0
e−rtcr1xt∈[xR,xA)dt
]
− E
[∫ τR
0
e−rtcr(1− αψ(xt))1xt∈[xI ,xA)dt
]
. (9)
This representation makes it possible to capture a crucial feature of mixed supervision:
Lemma 1 For any audit frequency ψ(x) ≤ 1/α, mixed supervision reduces supervision
costs as compared to the case when temporary regulatory administration is implemented
alone.
Indeed, condition ψ(x) ≤ 1/α implies that the expected instantaneous audit costs
ψ(x)αcr do not exceed the instantaneous costs of temporary regulatory administration,
cr. This will ensure an immediate cost gain from mixed supervision as compared to the
pure temporary regulatory administration strategy.
3.3 Optimal mixed supervision with perfect audit
technology: benchmark case
Let us ﬁrst examine the benchmark case, where the regulator has a single perfect
audit technology. Under perfect audit technology, bad management is always detectable
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during random audits. In such a context, the regulatory problem is to choose a function
ψ(x), x ∈ [xI , xA) and the inspection threshold xI that will induce good management in
the bank with minimum expected supervision costs:
Min
ψ(x),xI
C(x0)
s.t. ∆µxE ′G(x) + ψ(x)EG(x) ≥ γr, ∀x ∈ [xI , xA),
where C(x0) is given by (8).
3.3.1 Constant audit frequency
We start with a simple set-up where the regulator keeps audit frequency constant
over the whole random audit region. Given any arbitrary audit frequency ψ, the optimal
inspection threshold results from the binding incentive constraint of the bank, i.e., xI =
xI(ψ). Indeed, any xI > xI(ψ) would generate excessive costs of temporary regulatory
administration, while bank incentives can be created by random audits alone. Taking the
ﬁrst derivative of both parts of (7) on ψ, we obtain the following:
Lemma 2 Inspection threshold xI(ψ) is decreasing on ψ.
Since the inspection threshold depends on ψ, the impact of audit frequency on super-
vision costs is ambiguous. A higher random audit frequency would allow the regulator
to set a lower inspection threshold and, thereby, to reduce the costs of temporary regu-
latory administrations. But this would extend the random audit region, raising the total
random audit costs. However, for any ψ < 1, the overall eﬀect of random audit will be
beneﬁcial. It can be shown that the value of cost savings generated by mixed supervision
compared to the case when temporary regulatory administration is implemented over the
region [xR, xA) amounts to ∆C(ψ) such that:
∆C(ψ) = (1− αψ)c
[
β1(x
−β2
A − x−β2I )− β2xβ1−β2R (x−β1A − x−β1I )
]
β1 − β2 x
β2 > 0, (10)
where β1 > 0, β2 < 0 are the roots of characteristic equation 1/2σ
2β2+(µG−1/2σ2)β = r.
In the absence of an analytical solution for the optimal ψ, we resort to numerical
simulations in order to illustrate the cost gain from the optimally designed mixed super-
vision. Simulations are based on the parameter values calibrated to maintain a reasonable
balance between spending and gains: r = 0.04, µG = 0.03, µB = 0.01, σ = 0.2, γ = 0.2,
c = 0.1, D = 1, α = 1. The optimal audit frequency obtained varies from 0.16 to 0.23
depending on xR, which approximately corresponds to 4-6 audits per year. The cost
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gain generated by optimal mixed supervision as compared to the pure temporary regu-
latory administration strategy, ∆C(ψ), varies approximatively from 55% to 75%, which
explicitly conﬁrms a signiﬁcant cost advantage of mixed supervision.
Numerical experiments show that, for a ﬁxed technology gain ∆µ, the increase of mon-
itoring costs γr pushes up both audit and inspection thresholds, simultaneously leading
to expansion of the random audit region and the reduction of the optimal audit fre-
quency. As a result, ∆C(ψ) is increasing with monitoring costs, so that the cost-saving
eﬀect of mixed supervision becomes even more pronounced, as moral hazard incentives
get stronger.
It is also interesting to consider the impact of cash-ﬂow volatility σ on the optimal su-
pervision design. In fact, higher σ raises the bank's default probability, which makes the
bank managers more sensitive to the reduction of the cash-ﬂow growth rate and, thereby,
reduces moral hazard incentives. As a result, both audit and inspection thresholds, as
well as the optimal audit frequency, are decreasing with cash-ﬂow volatility. Thus, sur-
prisingly, less supervision eﬀorts would be needed in the context of higher macroeconomic
instability.
3.3.2 Continuously adjustable audit frequency
The second audit set-up allows for continuous adjustment of audit frequency to bank
cash ﬂow. For any given liquidation rule xR < x
B
R, the maximum social welfare (mini-
mum supervision costs) will be ensured by an audit frequency which makes the incentive-
compatibility constraint (7) binding, hereafter denoted as ψB(x). First, note that ψB(x)
will deliver the minimum audit costs, while maintaining bank incentives for good man-
agement practice. Second, as the bank becomes less and less inclined to maintain good
management when its cash ﬂow goes down, ψB(x) will increase with depreciation of x.
According to Lemma 1, the maximum feasible value it can attain is 1/α. But equality
ψB(xI) = 1/α also yields the lowest incentive-compatible inspection threshold, thereby
minimizing the total expected costs of temporary regulatory administrations. Then we
can state:13
Proposition 1 Under a single perfect audit technology, the optimal design of mixed su-
pervision implies:
• a continuously adjusted audit frequency on x ∈ [xBI , xA):
ψB(x) = (rγ −∆µxE ′G(x))/EG(x) (11)
13The proof is omitted.
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• an inspection threshold xBI : ψB(xBI ) = 1/α.
However, continuous adjustment of audit frequency may lead to some problems in
practice. First, continuous adjustment requires up to date and reliable information about
the bank's cash ﬂow. In reality, although the regulator has access to various information
sources, the probability of inaccurate data is rather high. Moreover, even when data is
reliable, we cannot rule out information delay. Yet when audit frequency is determined on
the basis of inaccurate data, it may be insuﬃcient to maintain bank incentives. Second, it
is easier to commit to a simple incentive mechanism that banks can clearly understand.
A more sophisticated regulatory strategy risks being misunderstood and therefore not
producing the required incentive eﬀect. In this context, a compromise solution might
involve several random audit regions, with audit frequency varying from region to region.
3.3.3 Stepwise adjustable audit frequency
Consider n random audit regions [xI , x2),[x2, x3),..., [xn, xA), where audit frequencies
{ψi}i=1..n are constant over each region. In order to homogenize notation, denote x1 = xI
and xn+1 = xA. Regulatory thresholds x1, .., xn can be either endogenous (i.e., resulting
from a regulatory cost-minimization program) or exogenous. Thus, the optimal audit
frequencies result from the binding incentive-compatibility constraint on each audit re-
gion: ψi = ψ
B(xi), i = 1..n. Indeed, any ψi < ψ
B(xi) would be insuﬃcient to create
incentives for good management on region [xi, xi+1), while any ψi > ψ
B(xi) would incur
useless audit costs. Obviously, ψi is stepwise decreasing with the bank's cash ﬂow (or,
equivalently, with the bank's asset value).
Regulatory thresholds, deﬁning audit regions, can be set in accordance with the rating
classiﬁcations of international rating agencies. An example of a possible supervision
strategy with stepwise-adjustable audit frequency is provided by Fig. 2. Given exogenous
regulatory thresholds xI , x2 and x3, continuously adjusted audit frequency (a thick dotted
line) is used to specify the optimal audit frequencies for each random audit region. Thus,
healthy banks (with x ≥ xA) can be free of any supervision. The lower the rating
assessment, the more frequent audits should be. Finally, for banks whose cash ﬂow is close
to the liquidation threshold, temporary regulatory administration becomes inevitable.
3.4 Optimal mixed supervision under a continuum of
audit technologies
In the previous section we discussed preventive supervision under the perfect audit
technology. However, in practice audit quality varies depending on many factors, such as
13
Figure 2: Mixed supervision with stepwise adjustable audit frequency
number of supervisory staﬀ involved, professional skills and remuneration of supervisors,
scale of examination, audit technique employed. For example, the regulator can examine
the bank's accounting, relying on the compulsory bank reports and involving a minimum
of staﬀ. Alternatively, a high-skilled audit team can realize on-site investigation of the
internal management process in the diﬀerent departments. Obviously, the latter audit
technology would provide a better estimation of the bank's ﬁnancial health, but would
require larger supervisory resources and greater spending.
In this section we investigate the optimal supervision strategy in a setting where the
regulator has access to the spectrum of audit technologies and can continuously adjust
both audit frequency and audit quality over the audit region. Denote T = [α, α] a
continuum of audit technologies which diﬀer as to quality and cost αcr. Audit quality
depends on audit eﬀort, α, and is measured by probability p(α) ∈ [0, 1] of uncovering
bad management in the bank, given that the bank operates under bad management
technology.14 Function p(α) is concave and strictly increasing on α with p(α) = 0 and
p(α) = 1.
When audit quality is imperfect, the probability of detecting bad management in a
small interval dt, given that bank managers have switched to bad management technology,
is reduced to ψp(α)dt. As audit quality is freely observable by bank managers, this will
reduce their incentives to choose good management as compared to the benchmark case.
14We assume that, if the bank operates under good management, the probability of uncovering bad
management technology as a result of an audit is zero.
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Thus, audit quality choice becomes an additional supervisory tool that will aﬀect the
optimal supervision design, and the new regulatory problem can be stated as follows:
Min
ψ(x),α(x),xI
C(x0)
s.t. ∆µxE ′G(x) + ψ(x)p(α(x))EG(x) ≥ γr, ∀x ∈ [xI , xA)
We are looking for ψ(x), α(x) and xI that minimize the total expected supervision
costs, complying with the incentive-compatibility constraint of the bank.15 Note that both
instantaneous random audit costs and inspection threshold are determined by α(x)ψ(x).
Using the incentive-compatibility constraint of the bank, we are able to present the opti-
mal audit frequency as a function of audit quality, ψ(x) = ψB(x)/p(α(x)). This represen-
tation shows that instantaneous random audit costs are increasing with "cost/quality"
ratio α/p(α). But the inspection threshold, provided by αψ(x) = 1, is also increasing
with this ratio.
Proposition 2 Under a continuum of audit technologies and continuously adjustable
audit frequency, the optimal design of mixed supervision implies:
• a single audit quality α? = argmin α/p(α), α ∈ T ;
• a continuously adjusted audit frequency ψ?(x) = ψB(x)/p(α?);
• an inspection threshold x?I = [ψ?]−1(1/α?).
Thus, given the possibility to adjust audit frequency, it appears optimal to maintain
a single (the most cost-eﬀective) audit technology, rather than to adjust audit quality
over audit region. Note that in the particular case where the regulator randomly chooses
between two available audit technologies at each audit event, it will also be optimal to use
a single audit technology throughout, since the "cost/quality" ratio will be monotonic on
α in this case.
We conclude this section with a brief illustration of the optimal supervision strategy in
a discrete case with several random audit regions and stepwise-adjustable audit frequency.
Example 1 Optimal supervision under stepwise-adjustable audit frequency.
15Note, that under constant audit frequency, the optimal audit quality results from the binding incen-
tive constraint of the bank and the problem solution is completely determined by the optimal choice of
random audit frequency.
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 As in practice it is easier to commit to a discrete supervision strategy, we consider
a random audit environment which allows for i = 1..n exogenously ﬁxed audit regions.
Audit frequencies ψi and audit technologies αi are supposed to be constant for each audit
region. Proceeding as in the continuous case, it can easily be shown that the optimal
audit quality is still given by α? = argmin α/p(α), α ∈ T across all audit regions, while
audit frequency should be adjusted as follows:
ψi(xi) = ψ
B(xi)/p(α
?), i = 1..n, (12)
where x1 = xI , xn+1 = xA and ψ
B(x) is given in (11).
Indeed, for any exogenous regulatory thresholds xi, i = 1..n, such a supervision strat-
egy would maintain the incentive constraint of the bank for each audit region, incurring
minimum supervision costs. It directly follows from this result that, in the particular
case with a single audit region and constant audit quality, the optimal audit quality will
be given by α? and the optimal inspection threshold will result from α?ψ?(xI) = 1. 
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4 Optimal preventive supervision with
delegated random audits
"The external auditor has an important role to play in the regulatory framework."
The Code of Practice, FSA (2011)
So far we have assumed that the supervision process was entirely undertaken by the
regulator. Hereafter, we refer to that setting as the nondelegation framework. In the
current section we consider the case where the regulator is able to hire an independent
audit agency to perform random audits at the bank, but may still perform some audits
himself.16
The agency is more eﬃcient in audit performance than the regulator: under the same
level of audit eﬀort α ∈ T , the agency has a higher probability q(α) of uncovering bad
management in the bank17 than the regulator, i.e., q(α) > p(α) and q(α) = 1. Given that
the audit eﬀort of the agency is unobservable by the regulator, audit delegation leads to
a problem of double moral hazard: the audit agency may be tempted to shirk, enjoying
instantaneous cost savings.18 As a result, the preventive eﬀect of supervision will be
destroyed: observing no audit eﬀort, the bank will adopt a bad management technology.
Therefore, in order to prevent moral hazard in the bank, it is essential to prevent moral
hazard in the agency. This can be realized through an incentive contract that induces
the agency to promote good management in the bank. In other words, in a delegation
framework, the regulator should launch a "chain" of incentives: an incentive contract
will induce the agency to exert appropriate audit eﬀort, which will induce the bank to
maintain good management technology.
The aim of the regulator in the current setting is still to ensure good management
in the bank at the minimum supervision cost. However, now an independent audit
agency can replace the regulator, performing random audits on the delegation region,
hereafter termed [x, x) ∈ [xR, xA), while outside this region the regulator will follow the
optimal supervision strategy stated in Proposition 2. For any given delegation region
[x, x) ∈ [xR, xA), the contract with the independent audit agency should specify:
• (i) audit parameters α(x) and ψ(x);
• (ii) the asset-based remuneration R(x) ≥ α(x)cr that the agency will receive at
each audit event;19
16In contrast to random audits, temporary administration can be performed only by the regulator.
17If the bank really operates under bad management.
18We exclude the possibility of collusion between the agency and the bank.
19We assume that the agency has limited liability and will accept a contract only on condition that
17
• (iii) a contract termination rule xT ≤ x, such that the contract with the agency
will expire when the bank's cash ﬂow reaches xT for the ﬁrst time;
20
• (iv) a lump-sum terminal payoﬀ RT ≥ 0 to the agency at the contract termination
date.
The remainder of this section is organized as follows. First, we examine the agency's
choice of audit eﬀort and outline a new regulatory problem. Then, we determine the min-
imum incentive-compatible contract with the agency and discuss the optimal supervision
strategy in the delegation framework.
4.1 Moral hazard in the agency and the new regulatory problem
First, we consider the agency's choice of audit eﬀort, given any arbitrary contract. The
agency maximizes contract continuation value W (x) ≥ 0, which is contingent on current
bank cash ﬂow x and represents the total expected value of future contract pay-oﬀs, net
of audit costs:
W (x) = E
[∫ τT
0
e−rtψ(xt)(R(xt)− α(xt)cr)1xt∈[x,x)dt+ e−rτTRT
]
, (13)
where τT = inf{t ≥ 0 : xt ≤ xT}.
Let us ﬁx a delegation region [x, x) ∈ [xR, xA). For any arbitrary audit frequency
ψ(x), we deﬁne the audit quality αψ(x) ∈ T that makes the incentive constraint of bank
binding:
αψ(x) = q
−1(ψB(x)/ψ(x)), x ∈ [x, x), (14)
where ψB(x) is given by (11).
The agency has two options: either to induce good management in the bank, or
to let the bank operate under bad management. In the interests of maintaining good
management in the bank, the agency will optimally use audit quality αψ(x), as this
induces the bank to maintain good management technology, incurring minimum audit
cost. Otherwise, the agency will not exert audit eﬀort at all, since any α ∈ [α, αψ(x))
generates useless audit cost, without creating any incentive eﬀect on the bank. The choice
between these two options is driven by expected instantaneous cost savings on the one
hand and expected loss of contract continuation value on the other. Indeed, by exerting
no eﬀort during the audit, the agency saves the amount αψ(x)cr. However, if it observes
each payment provides non-negative proﬁt.
20Strictly speaking, the contract with the agency should specify retirement time τT . However, as
we are dealing with a stationary problem, τT represents the ﬁrst time the bank's cash ﬂow reaches a
termination threshold xT .
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no audit eﬀort, the bank will switch to the bad management technology that implies lower
expected returns on assets and, consequently, reduces the contract continuation value of
the agency. We can thus state the agency maximization problem as follows:
Max
ut∈{0,1}
{A(ut)W (xt) + ψ(xt)(R(xt)− utαψ(xt)cr)} = 0, (15)
where xt ∈ [x, x), A(ut) is given by (3),W (xT ) = RT and ut = 1 when the agency chooses
audit technology αψ(x).
Thus, the agency will use quality αψ(x), while the expected instantaneous loss of
contract continuation value, caused by the bad management in the bank, will exceed the
expected instantaneous cost savings:
∆µxW ′(x) ≥ ψ(x)αψ(x)cr, x ∈ [x, x). (16)
Taking into account this result, let us turn to the regulatory problem in the delegation
framework. On the one hand, delegation allows the regulator to beneﬁt from the greater
audit eﬃciency of the agency, saving on random audit costs:
∆CAψ(x0) = E
[∫ τR
0
e−rt(st − αψ(xt)ψ(xt))cr1xt∈[x,x]dt
]
, (17)
where
st =
1 xt ∈ [xR, x?I ]α?ψ?(xt) xt ∈ [x?I , xA]
and parameters x?I , α
?(xt), ψ
?(xt) are given by Proposition 2.
On the other hand, the regulator will have to bear the additional cost of compen-
sating the agency. Note that outside the delegation region, the regulator will follow the
supervision strategy that is optimal for the nondelegation framework. Then, for any
x0 ≥ xA, the regulatory problem is to maximize the gain from delegation, maintaining
good management at the bank through the incentive contract with the agency:21
Max
αψ(x),ψ(x),R(x),xT ,RT ,[x,x)
{∆CAψ(x0)−Wψ(x0)} ≥ 0
s.t.

∆µxW ′(x) ≥ ψ(x)αψ(x)cr, ∀x ∈ [x, x) (ICA)
R(x) ≥ αψ(x)cr, ∀x ∈ [x, x) (PCA1)
RT ≥ 0 (PCA2)
21Note that the regulator will never resort to delegation if ∆CAψ(x0) < Wψ(x0), as in this case he
can ensure preventive supervision by himself at lower cost.
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where αψ(x) is given by (14), [x, x) ∈ [xR, xA), ∆CAψ(x0) is given by (17) and Wψ(x) is
given by (13) for α(x) = αψ(x).
To design the optimal supervision strategy for the above regulatory problem, we
proceed as follows. First, for any arbitrary [x, x) ∈ [xR, xA), ψ(x) and corresponding
αψ(x), we specify an incentive compensation scheme that ensures the minimum incentive-
compatible contract continuation value. Then, we deﬁne the optimal audit parameters.
Finally, we discuss the pattern of the optimal supervision strategy in the delegation
framework.
4.2 Optimal contract with the agency
Let us ﬁx any arbitrary delegation region [x, x) ∈ [xR, xA). For any audit frequency
ψ(x), we take audit quality αψ(x), given by (14). Thus, the regulatory problem is to
ﬁnd the optimal compensation scheme {R(x), RT} and termination rule xT ensuring the
minimum Wψ(x0) ≥ 0, and simultaneously satisfying constraints ICA, PCA1, PCA2.
The regulator therefore needs to ﬁnd the minimum incentive-compatible Wψ(x0) ≥ 0,
which makes ICA binding and satisﬁes PCA1 at the lower bound of the delegation
region. Integrating ICA, we get:
W ∗ψ(x) = Wψ(x) +
cr
∆µ
(∫ x
x
ψ(y)αψ(y)
y
dy
)
, x ∈ [x, x). (18)
Naturally, the minimum feasible W ∗ψ(x) would be ensured by the minimum constant
Wψ(x) ≥ 0, which is chosen in such a way as to respect participation constraint PCA1.
Replacing the minimum incentive W ∗ψ(x) in (15) with ut = 1, we can easily get incentive
remuneration Rψ(x) and check the participation constraint. Then, two cases are possible.
If PCA1 is satisﬁed for any arbitrary Wψ(x), it would be optimal to impose Wψ(x) = 0,
which automatically gives the solution for termination rule and terminal payoﬀ. Other-
wise, the minimum feasible Wψ(x) > 0 results from Rψ(x) = αψ(x)cr, and we need to
determine the minimum incentive contract on x ∈ [xR, x) in order to ﬁnd the optimal
contract termination rule and terminal pay-oﬀ.
Proposition 3 For any [x, x) ∈ [xR, xA), the optimal incentive contract with an inde-
pendent audit agency implies:
• (i) audit parameters α?? = argmin
α∈T
α/q(α) and ψ??(x) = ψB(x)/q(α??);
• (ii) per-audit remuneration Rψ??(x):
Rψ??(x) = α
??cr +
rW ∗ψ??(x)
ψ??(x)
− α
??cr
∆µ
(
µG − 1
2
σ2 +
1
2
σ2x
∂ψ??(x)
∂x
)
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• (iii) termination rule x??T = max {xR, x∗}, where x∗ ∈ [xR, x] is such thatW ∗∗ψ??(x∗) =
0, and terminal pay-oﬀ R??T = W
∗∗
ψ??(x
??
T ) ≥ 0, where:
W ∗∗ψ??(x) =
ψ??(x)α??
β1 − β2
cr
∆µ
[(
x
x
)β1
−
(
x
x
)β2]
+
Wψ(x)
β1 − β2
[
β1
(
x
x
)β2
− β2
(
x
x
)β1]
, (19)
for x ∈ [xR, x) and Wψ(x) : Rψ??(x) = α??cr.
Thus, the optimal audit parameters for the agency are determined in the same man-
ner as for the regulator, allowing for a higher technology frontier q(α). The minimum
incentive remuneration Rψ??(x) implies two components: audit cost compensation, α
??cr,
and moral hazard rent, which makes agency welfare contingent on bank ﬁnancial health
and thus creates suﬃcient incentives for maintaining good management in the bank.22
If the contract is not worthless at the moment of bank liquidation, i.e., W ∗∗ψ??(xR) > 0,
the regulator has to give the agency a positive terminal payoﬀ R??T = W
∗∗
ψ??(xR) in order to
compensate for the loss of potential proﬁts from the contract if the bank had kept going.
Otherwise, the contract termination occurs at x∗ ∈ (xR, x] such that W ∗∗ψ??(x∗) = 0,
and the agency doesn't receive any terminal payment. In the particular case, when
W ∗ψ??(x) = 0, the contract termination rule coincides with a lower bound of the delegation
region, i.e., x??T = x. We show in Appendix B that this is always the case when µ ≤ σ2:
Lemma 3 For µG ≤ σ2, x??T = x and R??T = 0.
Once we have the optimal incentive contract for any [x, x), the optimal design of
supervision strategy will be determined by the x that ensures the maximal gain from
delegation.23 In fact, for any x ∈ [xR, xA), the optimal x will be given by the critical level
of cash ﬂow, for which instantaneous costs of delegated random audit become equal to
instantaneous costs of non-delegated supervision.
Lemma 4 It is not optimal to delegate random audits in the left neighborhood of the
audit threshold, i.e., x < xA.
Thus, according to Lemma 4, delegated audits should not completely replace regula-
tory audits. The point is that, when bank cash ﬂow is in the left neighborhood of xA,
optimal audit frequency tends to zero. As audit events become too rare, remuneration
22The convexity of ψB(x) does not allow us to identify the exact pattern of moral hazard rent. However,
we ﬁnd that moral hazard rent increases with bank cash ﬂow under suﬃcient condition σ2 ≤ (2µG+r)/3.
23The optimal x can be found through numerical simulations. Note that x ≥ xFBI , where xFBI :
α??ψ??(x) = 1 denotes the optimal lower bound of the delegation region (and, simultaneously, the
optimal inspection threshold) in the First Best case, where the audit eﬀorts of the agency are freely
observable by the regulator.
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for each audit event has to be generous enough to provide the agency with suﬃcient in-
centive for the appropriate audit eﬀort. Consequently, in the left neighborhood of xA, it
will be less costly for the regulator to ensure preventive supervision himself, rather than
to compensate the agency for the eﬀort. Then, there are two feasible alternatives for the
design of supervision involving external auditors:
• x is given by ψ??(x)Rψ??(x) = cr: this is the case if x < x?I and there is at least one
x < x?I such that ψ
??(x)Rψ??(x) > cr.
• x is given by ψ??(x)Rψ??(x) = α?ψ?(x)cr: this is always the case if x ≥ x?I , or if
x < x?I but ψ
??(x)Rψ??(x) < cr for ∀x < x?I .
We conclude this section by providing an illustration of the optimal incentive contract
in a discrete setting with a single audit technology α?? and stepwise-adjustable audit
frequency.
Example 2 Optimal incentive contract in a discrete case.
 Consider the audit set-up with stepwise adjustable audit frequency, where delegation
region [x, x) consists of n exogenous intervals and the agency owns a single audit technol-
ogy α??. To homogenize notation, we denote x1 = x and xn+1 = x. Then, the minimum
incentive compatible contract continuation value on [x, x) can be written as follows:
W ∗ψ??(x) =
cr
∆µ
α??
q(α??)
(
i−1∑
k=1
ψB(xk) ln(xk+1/xk) + ψ
B(xi) ln(x/xi) + ψ
B(x1)ρ
)
, (20)
where ρ = (µG − 1/2σ2)/r and x ∈ [xi, xi+1), i = 1..(n− 1).
Replacing W ∗ψ??(x) in ODE (15) with ut = 1, we obtain minimal incentive-compatible
remuneration:
Rψ??(x) = α
??cr
(1/2σ2 − µB)
∆µ
+
rW ∗ψ??(x)
ψ??(xi)
, (21)
where x ∈ [xi, xi+1), i = 1..n and W ∗ψ??(x) is given by (20).
Thus, the minimum incentive remuneration in a discrete set-up consists of the ﬁxed
reward and the variable bonus, increasing with bank cash ﬂow. Note that in this particular
case we have W ∗ψ??(x) > 0 and, consequently, x
??
T < x.
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5 Conclusion
This paper outlines a preventive supervision strategy to combat moral hazard in bank
asset management. Using an incentive-based approach, our design combines temporary
regulatory administration with random audits to reduce supervision costs. We show in
this context that, under a single perfect audit technology, minimum supervision costs can
be ensured through the continuous adjustment of audit frequency to a bank's ﬁnancial
health. Moreover, the cost-saving eﬀect of mixed supervision becomes even greater when
the regulator has access to the spectrum of audit technologies, diﬀering in quality and
cost. We obtain proof that, given a large choice of audit technologies, it will be optimal
to use a single audit technology throughout, the one with the minimum "cost/quality"
ratio, continuously increasing audit frequency when the bank's cash ﬂow decreases.
We also explore a setting where the random audit can be delegated to an independent
audit agency, able to ensure the same audit quality at lower cost than the regulator. We
focus on the case where the audit eﬀort of audit agency is unobservable by the regulator,
so that he needs to motivate the agency to maintain good management in the bank
through an incentive compensation scheme with embedded moral hazard rent. As moral
hazard rent makes it too costly to compensate the agency for eﬀort when the bank's cash
ﬂow is relatively high, it would be optimal to implement only a partial delegation of the
random audits. In other words, delegation should not completely replace the regulatory
audit. However, a partial delegation can be beneﬁcial for the regulator, allowing total
supervision costs to be reduced due to greater eﬃciency of the agency.
In fact, in several countries there is already a close collaboration between banking
supervisors and external auditors. Thus, a Swiss banking supervision system is heavily
relied on external auditors, who collect information about banks and carry out direct
supervisory tasks, checking bank compliance with regulatory requirements.24 After the
recent crisis, ﬁnancial regulatory authorities in UK are also willing to enhance the role
of external auditors in supervision process ("The Code of Practice", FSA (2011)). In
Germany, even though the banking supervision system relies on the direct review by
regulatory authorities, external auditors have an obligation to inform regulators about
any irregularities uncovered during the audit of banks. Giving the increasing role of
external auditors in banking supervision, a debatable question is: who should remunerate
the independent audit agency, the audited bank or the regulator? In Swiss banking
supervision practice, for instance, an audit ﬁrm involved in the supervisory process is
remunerated by the audited bank. At ﬁrst glance, this rule would appear to allow the
regulator to reduce supervision spending. However, the ﬁnancial dependence of the audit
24See Hüpkes (2005) on the role of external auditors in Swiss bank supervision.
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ﬁrm on the bank may adversely impact audit quality: it creates favorable conditions for
bank pressure and, under competition in the audit market, may lead to greater indulgence
by the audit ﬁrm towards its auditee. In the context of our model, any decision on
whether to transfer the ﬁnancial burden of the audit to the bank or not will be driven by
the trade-oﬀ between incentive eﬀect and cost of supervision. If the regulator provides
the audit agency with audit instructions and makes the bank pay for each audit event,
given that these costs will reduce the incentive eﬀect of random audits on the bank, the
regulator will need to perform more temporary administrations in order to prevent bad
management in the bank. This implies higher temporary administration costs for the
regulator. Thus, it might be cheaper for the regulator to pay for the audits himself and
perform less temporary administrations, rather than to charge the bank for audits but
have to bear higher temporary administration costs.
24
6 Appendix A. Valuation of contingent claims
A.1. Bank equity value
Under the good management technology, equity value EG(x) follows ODE:
1/2σ2x2E ′′G(x) + µGxE
′
G(x)− rEG(x) + x− rD − γr = 0. (A1)
The generals solution of the above equation is given by:
EG(x) = C1x
β1 + C2x
β2 + νGx−D − γ, (A2)
where C1, C2 are any arbitrary coeﬃcients, νG = (r − µG)−1 and β1 > 0, β2 < 0 are the
roots of characteristic equation:
1/2σ2β2 + (µG − 1/2σ2)β = r. (A3)
Under no-bubble condition limx→+∞EG(x) = x − D − γ and boundary condition
EG(xR) = 0, the bank's equity value follows:
EG(x) = νGx−D − γ + (D + γ − νGxR) (x/xR)β2 . (A4)
A.2. Supervision costs in the nondelegation case
For any given ψ(x), α(x) and xI , the total supervision costs C(x) in the nondelegation
framework are driven by the following system:
1/2σ2x2C ′′(x) + µGxC ′(x)− rC(x) = 0 when x ≥ xA
1/2σ2x2C ′′(x) + µGxC ′(x)− rC(x) + α(x)ψ(x)cr = 0 when x ∈ [xI , xA)
1/2σ2x2C ′′(x) + µGxC ′(x)− rC(x) + cr = 0 when x ∈ [xR, xI)
Consider the benchmark case where the regulator owns a single perfect audit quality
and ψ = const. Using the limit condition limx→+∞C(x) = 0, terminal condition C(xR) =
0, value-matching conditions C−(xA) = C+(xA) and C−(xI) = C+(xI), smooth-pasting
conditions C ′−(xA) = C
′
+(xA) and C
′
−(xI) = C
′
+(xI), we get the following solution for
x ≥ xA:
C(x) = k(ψ, xA, xI)x
β2 , (A5)
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with cost coeﬃcient k(ψ, xA, xI) given by
k(ψ, xA, xI) = k
B(xA)− (1− αψ)
c
[
β1(x
−β2
A − x−β2I )− β2xβ1−β2R (x−β1A − x−β1I )
]
β1 − β2 , (A6)
where kB(xA) is a cost coeﬃcient in the case of the pure temporary regulatory adminis-
tration strategy (where xA = xI):
kB(xA) =
c
β1 − β2 (β1x
−β2
A − β2xβ1−β2R x−β1A )− cx−β2R . (A7)
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7 Appendix B. Proofs
Proof of Proposition 2
 Using expression (9) and Lemma 1, we rewrite the regulatory problem as follows:
Max
α(x),ψ(x),xI
E
[∫ τR
0
e−rtcr(1− α(xt)ψ(xt))1xt∈[xI ,xA)dt|x0
]
s.t. ∆µxE ′G(x) + ψ(x)p(α(x))EG(x) ≥ γr, ∀x ∈ [xI , xA),
where x0 ≥ xA, α(x) ∈ T and ψ(x) ≤ 1/α.
The minimal incentive-compatible audit frequency is given by the binding incentive-
compatibility constraint of the bank:
ψ(x) = ψB(x)/p(α(x)), (B1)
where x ∈ [xI , xA), α ∈ T and ψB(x) is given by (11).
Then, instantaneous random audit costs are proportional to:
α(x)ψ(x) = ψB(x)α(x)/p(α(x)). (B2)
As ψB(x) does not depend on audit quality, the minimal α(x)ψ(x) will be ensured by
a single audit technology, the one with the minimum ratio α/p(α).
Let us consider the inspection threshold. For any arbitrary ψ and α, the minimum
incentive compatible xI is given by the binding incentive-compatibility constraint. By
Lemma 2, xI is increasing on ψ. Thus, the lowest feasible inspection threshold results
from: ψ(xI) = 1/α. Using (B3), we can rewrite this equality as follows:
ψB(xI) = p(α(xI))/α(xI). (B3)
Therefore, a random audit technology with minimum α/p(α) also ensures the lowest
incentive-compatible inspection threshold. Then, the audit quality α? such that:
α? = argmin
α∈T
α/p(α) (B4)
provides a maximum gain from random audits and thus ensures minimum total supervi-
sion costs.
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Proof of Proposition 3
3.1. An incentive contract continuation value
 Let us ﬁx some delegation region [x, x) ∈ [xR, xA). For any ψ(x), we consider an audit
quality αψ(x) that makes the incentive constraint of the bank binding:
∆µxE ′G(x) + ψ(x)q(αψ(x))EG(x) = γr, x ∈ [x, x). (B5)
Thus,
αψ(x) = q
−1(ψB(x)/ψ(x)),
where ψB(x) is given by (11).
Then, for any x0 ≥ xA, the regulatory problem can be rewritten as follows:
Min
R(x),RT ,xT
Wψ(x0) ≥ 0
s.t.

∆µxW ′ψ(x) ≥ ψ(x)αψ(x)cr, ∀x ∈ [x, x) (ICA)
R(x) ≥ αψ(x)cr, ∀x ∈ [x, x) (PCA1)
RT ≥ 0 (PCA2)
where αψ(x) is given by (B5).
For x ∈ [x, x) ∈ [xI , xA) the minimal incentive compatible contract continuation value
is given by the binding ICA:
W ∗ψ(x) = Wψ(x) +
cr
∆µ
(∫ x
x
ψ(y)αψ(y)
y
dy
)
, x ∈ [x, x), (B6)
where a constant Wψ(x) ≥ 0 is deﬁned below.
At the same time, W ∗ψ(x) follows ODE:
A(1)W ∗ψ(x) + ψ(x)(Rψ(x)− αψ(x)cr) = 0. (B7)
Replacing W ∗ψ(x) from (B6) into (B7), we get an incentive remuneration:
Rψ(x) = αψ(x)cr+
rW ∗ψ(x)
ψ(x)
− cr
∆µ
(
ψ(x)αψ(x)(µG − 1
2
σ2) +
1
2
σ2x
∂(ψ(x)αψ(x))
∂x
)
. (B8)
We now need to ﬁnd Wψ(x) ≥ 0 that simultaneously minimizes W ∗ψ(x) and ensures
a participation constraint Rψ(x) ≥ αψ(x)cr for ∀x ∈ [x, x). Two cases are possible. If
the term in parenthesis in (B8) is negative, the participation constraint will be respected
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throughout, so that the minimal W ∗ψ(x) will be ensured by Wψ(x) = 0.
25 Otherwise, the
minimum W ∗ψ(x) will be ensured by the minimal feasible Wψ(x) > 0 which results from
Rψ(x) = αψ(x)cr. Thus, we have:
Wψ(x) = max
{
0;
cr
∆µ
(
ψ(x)αψ(x)(µG − 1
2
σ2) +
1
2
σ2x
∂(ψ(x)αψ(x))
∂x
|x=x
)}
. (B9)
3.2. A terminal payoﬀ and a termination rule
The minimal incentive-compatible terminal payoﬀ will be given by the contract con-
tinuation value at the liquidation threshold, R??T = W
∗
ψ(x
??
T ), where x
??
T is the optimal
termination rule. Indeed, any RT > R
??
T incurs an excessive compensation over the whole
delegation region, while RT < R
??
T incurs a discontinuity of the contract at x.
Naturally, when Wψ(x) = 0, we have x
??
T = x and R
??
T = 0.
Now let us consider the case when Wψ(x) > 0. The general solution for the contract
continuation value on x < x is given by:
W ∗∗ψ (x) = C1x
β1 + C2x
β2 , (B10)
where C1 and C2 are unknown constants.
Using the value-matching condition W ∗∗ψ (x) = W
∗
ψ(x) and the smooth-pasting condi-
tion W ∗∗ψ
′(x) = W ∗ψ
′(x), we obtain:
W ∗∗ψ (x) =
ψ(x)αψ(x)
β1 − β2
cr
∆µ
(xx
)β1
−
(
x
x
)β2
︸ ︷︷ ︸
<0
+ Wψ(x)β1 − β2
β1(xx
)β2
− β2
(
x
x
)β1
︸ ︷︷ ︸
>0
 ,
(B11)
where Wψ(x) is given by Rψ(x) = αψ(x)cr.
Since Wψ(x) > 0, W
∗∗
ψ
′(x) > 0 for x < x and limx→0W ∗∗ψ (x) = −∞, there exists a
unique x∗ ∈ [xR, x) such that W ∗∗ψ (x∗) = 0. Thus, two cases are possible:
(i) if x∗ < xR, we have x??T = xR and R
??
T = W
∗∗
ψ (xR) > 0;
(ii) if x∗ > xR, we have x??T = x
∗ and R??T = 0.
25Consequently, this will imply Rψ(x) > αψ(x)cr.
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3.3. Optimal audit parameters
Now, allowing for the preceding results, we need to determine the optimal audit param-
eters ψ(x) and αψ(x) that ensure:
Max
αψ(x),ψ(x)
{∆CAψ(x0)−W ∗ψ(x0)} ≥ 0, (B12)
for any x0 ≥ xA.
Since the pair ψ(x) and αψ(x) satisﬁes the binding incentive constraint of the bank,
we can express ψ(x) as follows:
ψ(x) = ψB(x)/q(αψ(x)), (B13)
where ψB(x) is given by (11). Then, ∆CAψ(x0) can be rewritten as follows:
∆CAψ(x0) = E
[∫ τR
0
e−rt
(
st − ψB(xt) αψ(xt)
q(αψ(xt))
)
cr1xt∈[x,x]dt|x0
]
, (B14)
where
st =
1 xt ∈ [xR, x?I ]α?ψ?(xt) xt ∈ [x?I , xA]
and parameters x?I , α
?(xt), ψ
?(xt) are given in Proposition 2.
The minimal incentive W ∗ψ(x0) is:
W ∗ψ(x0) = Wψ(x)
(x0
x
)β2
=
(
c
∆µ
∫ x
x
αψ(y)
q(αψ(y))
ψB(y)
y
dy +Wψ(x)
)(x0
x
)β2
, (B15)
where Wψ(x) is given by (B11) and β2 is a negative root of (A3).
Note that, for x > x, a constant Wψ(x) does not depend on audit parameters. Then,
the solution of (B12) will be given by α?? = argmin
α∈T
α/q(α), as it simultaneously maxi-
mizes ∆CAψ(x0) and minimizes the integrand in the expression ofW
∗
ψ(x0). Consequently,
the optimal audit frequency is given by: ψ??(x) = ψB(x)/q(α??). 
Proof of Lemma 3
 Let us show that x < xA. Replacing α?? and ψ??(x) into (B6) and (B8), we obtain:
Rψ??(x) = α
??cr +
rW ∗ψ??(x)
ψB(x)
− α
??cr
∆µ
(
µG − 1/2σ2 + 1/2σ2∂ψ
B(x)
∂x
x
ψB(x)
)
. (B16)
30
Taking the ﬁrst derivative of ψB(x) on x, we get:
∂ψB(x)
∂x
= −∆µ(E
′
G(x) + xE
′′
G(x))
EG(x)
− ψB(x)E
′
G(x)
EG(x)
< 0. (B17)
Since ψB(xA) = 0, we obtain limx→xA−Rψ??(x) = +∞. Therefore, there always exists
a non-empty region [x, xA) where α
?ψ?(x) < Rψ??(x)ψ
??(x). Thus, we have x < xA. 
Proof of Lemma 4
 Let us show that, for µG ≤ σ2, the minimal feasibleWψ??(x) = 0. Let consider the sign
of the term in parenthesis of expression (B8), allowing for the optimal audit parameters
α??, ψ??(x) and any arbitrary x ∈ [xR, xA):
c
∆µ
α??
q(α??)
(
ψB(x)(µG − 1
2
σ2) +
1
2
σ2x
∂ψB(x)
∂x
)
. (B18)
This will be equivalent to consider the sign of function f(x) such that:
f(x) = x
∂ψB(x)
∂x
+
(µG − 1/2σ2)
1/2σ2
ψB(x). (B19)
Using (B17), we can rewrite f(x) as follows:
f(x) = −∆µx(E
′
G(x) + xE
′′
G(x))
EG(x)
− ψB(x)
(
xE ′G(x)
EG(x)
− (µG − 1/2σ
2)
1/2σ2
)
. (B20)
Note that EG(x) is convex. Then, for xR and any x > xR we can state:
EG(x) ≤ EG(xR) + E ′G(x)(x− xR) ≤ EG(xR) + xE ′G(x) = xE ′G(x). (B21)
Since xE ′G(x)/EG(x) ≥ 1, for µG ≤ σ2 we have f(x) < 0, so the expression (B18) is
negatively signed for any x ∈ [xR, xA). According to (B9), we have Wψ??(x) = 0. Then,
x??T = x and R
??
T = 0. 
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